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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION-CONSTRUC-
TION AND REASONABLENESS OF TARIFF CLASSIFICATION-Respondent railroads 
sued in the Court of Claims to recover from petitioner United States, as 
shipper, the difference between actual tariff payments and those allegedly 
due on shipments of aerial bomb cases containing napalm gel. Petitioner 
alternatively asserted that (1) since the bombs as shipped were non-explosive, 
respondent's advocated classification as "incendiary bombs" was inappli-
cable, or (2) if such classification were held to apply, then the rate was 
unreasonable, and preliminary resort to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion must be had for a determination of reasonableness. On certiorari from 
summary judgment for respondent, held, reversed.1 The commission has 
exclusive primary jurisdiction, not only upon the issue of reasonableness 
of the tariff, but also when, as in the instant case, "the questions of con-
struction and reasonableness are so intertwined that the same factors are 
determinative on both issues" upon the matter of tariff construction. 
United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). 
Initially formulated to take full advantage of administrative compe-
tence and to attain and insure uniform tariff application among shippers,2 
the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction arises only when statu-
tory provisions are such that administrative and judicial jurisdiction is 
concurrent.a In such a case, the rule may be broadly stated as requiring 
that questions involving the exercise of administrative discretion or "ex-
pertise" be first decided by the agency rather than the court.4 Thus, allega-
tions of unreasonable or discriminatory carrier rates5 and practices6 have con-
sistently signaled judicial invocation of the commission's peculiar technical 
capacity for fact-finding and fact-interpretation. Where, however, the stated 
1 Douglas, J., dissented. Justices Reed and Brennan did not participate. 
2 Texas and Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). Of the 
decision, DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 665 (1951), makes this comment: "This was obvi-
ously judicial legislation, but the reasons the Court gave to justify its holding were power-
ful ones. If courts and juries could determine reasonableness of rates, uniformity would 
be impossible." 
3 The Interstate Commerce Commission's plenary, though not specifically exclusive, 
jurisdiction over determination and enforcement of reasonable rates, classifications, and 
practices by carriers is described in 41 Stat. 484 (l920), as amended 54 Stat. 911 (1940), 49 
U.S.C. (1952) §15 (1). See also 34 Stat. 589 (1906). 
4 VoM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §213 (1942), and DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAw 664 (1951). The doctrine is to be distinguished from that of "exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies," which forbids judicial supervision of the administrative process until 
the latter has been exhausted. Jaffe, "Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Anti-Trust 
Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 577 at 579 (1954). 
5 E.g., Texas and Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., note 2 supra; Robinson v. 
Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 222 U.S. 506 (1912); Director General of Railroads v. The 
Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498 (1921). 
6E.g., Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481 
(1910); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Solum, 247 U.S. 477 (1918); Western & Atlantic R. v. 
Georgia Public Service Commission, 267 U.S. 493 (1925). 
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wrong is committed in relation to a non-discretionary standard, as in for-
bidden departures from a published tariff, 7 violations of an unambiguous 
contract for distribution of cars,8 or payment of illegal rebates,9 the matter 
becomes merely one of addressing "fixed law to the established fact,"1o and 
requires no primary administrative cognizance. The accepted, though not 
unchallenged,11 line of demarcation adduced from these decisions-i.e., fact 
questions and matters requiring technical acumen belong initially to the 
agencies, questions of law solely to the courts12-has perhaps proved most 
difficult to draw when dispute focuses upon construction of tariff classifi-
cation language, as in the principal case. Originally maintaining that 
determination of a controverted rate application to specific goods was one 
demanding primary administrative jurisdiction,1 3 the Supreme Court in 
Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co. retreated to the position 
that (1) words of a tariff when clearly used in their ordinary meaning pre-
sent a question of law susceptible of unassisted judicial consideration, and 
(2) only when the technical or non-technical tenor of the words was not 
apparent would prior factual construction be necessary.1 4 This decision 
has been frequently cited, sometimes mechanically, by a host of lower fed-
eral courts to support their own independent interpretation of rate cate-
gories.15 Significant, then, is the present Court's candid refusal to permit 
judicial consideration of the construction question. "Courts which do not 
make rates cannot know with exactitude the factors which go into the rate-
making process. And for the court here to undertake to fix the limits of 
the tariff's application without knowledge of such factors ... is tantamount 
7 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913). 
s Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121 (1915); Eastern R. Co. 
of New Mexia> v. Littlefield, 237 U.S. 140 (1915). 
9 Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U.S. 247 (1913). 
10 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., note 7 supra, at 197. 
11 "While there have been assertions that the doctrine has no application to 'pure' 
questions of law .•. there is but infrequently an opportunity to raise such a question .•• 
[and] few issues which the oourts are likely henceforward to characterize as purely legal. 
Where the legal question is bound up with the administrative question, the rule of prior 
resort applies." COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND TIIE COURTS 318 (1951). An ex-
haustive study of the "law-fact" distinction in review of administrative determinations is 
found in Jaffe, "Judicial Review: Question of Law," 69 HARv. L. REv. 239 (1955) and 
Jaffe, "Judicial Review: Question of Fact," 69 HARv. L. REv. 1020 (1956). 
12DAV1S, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 666 (1951), citing Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants 
Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922). 
13 Texas 8: Pacific R. Co. v. American Tie 8: Timber Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914), involving 
the application of a "lumber" tariff to oak railway ties. 
14 Note 12 supra. The Court felt that in the event a question of law were judicially 
decided, requisite uniformity could be achieved through Supreme Court review. 
15 E.g., American Ry. Express Co. v. Price Bros., Inc., (5th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 67 
(small onions); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Fox 8: London, Inc., (2d Cir. 1938) 93 F. (2d) 669 
(metal scrap); Murray Co. v. Gulf, C. 8: S.F. R. Co., (N.D. Tex. 1945) 59 F. Supp. 366 
(twisted coil metal cylinders); United States v. Louisville 8: Nashville R. Co., (6th Cir. 
1955) 221 F. (2d) 698 (products oomposed "partly of silver''). See also the opinion of 
Brandeis, J., author of the majority decision in Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Ele-
vator Co., note 12 supra, in W. B. Brown 8: Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville 8: Nashville R. 
Co., 299 U.S. 393 (1937). 
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to engaging in judicial guesswork."16 Although purportedly re-affirming 
Great Northern by continued recognition of at least minimal primary in-
terpretive power in the courts, the opinion plainly evinces a rejuvenation 
of the Court's original distrust of judicial construction of rates, and indi-
cates, as was recently predicted, an "increasing respect for administrative 
adjudication."17 It is doubtful that any tariff classification, sufficiently 
ambiguous as to warrant litigation between carrier and shipper, could also 
be so distinctly applicable or non-applicable as to preclude prior adminis-
trative resort under the present announced standard. Such an improbable 
circumstance, when united with the Court's acknowledgment of the essen-
tial relation between the government's assertion of inapplicability and the 
administrative question of reasonableness, leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that seldom, if ever,18 will construction of tariff rates be considered 3: 
question of law initially determinable by the judiciary. The coincident 
increase in an already heavy administrative burden is perhaps to be regret-
ted, but it would appear that this unfortunate consequence is at least 
neutralized by the greater certitude afforded claimants in choosing the 
initial forum. 
Michael Scott 
16 Principal case at 68. 
17 COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 318 (1951). It has frequently been 
suggested that the doctrine provides a convenient means for permitting a flexible alloca-
tion of business between the courts and the agencies. Jaffe, "Primary Jurisdiction Recon-
sidered: The Anti-Trust Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 577 at 588 (1954). See also Stason, 
"Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action," 25 MINN. L. REv. 
560 at 566 (1941). 
18 The sole exception specifically cited by the Court in the principal case is the situa-
tion where the commission "has already construed the particular tariff at issue or has 
clarified the factors underlying it," citing Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U.S. 631 (1942), in which 
the issue was clearly determinable by a previous commission ruling. Principal case at 69. 
